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In the 21st century, the World Ocean is becoming a key factor in global socio-economic 
dynamics and a geoeconomic and geopolitical priority of many countries. The 
Russian Federation, whose economy, infrastructure, and settlement system have been 
gravitating towards the sea since the late 1990s, is no exception. This article aims to 
identify and provide a conceptual framework for the phenomenon of Russia’s coastal 
borderlands and their constituent ‘strongholds’. It also explores the factors and features 
of the economic dynamics of the coastal borderlands amid the post-2014 geopolitical 
turbulence. Economic and statistical methods are used to highlight the irregularity of 
the economic and settlement patterns across Russia’s coastal borderlands, in their water 
and land areas. It is shown that Russian economic and military activities have clustered 
there to create 14 ‘strongholds’, including two emerging ones. The current confrontation 
between Russia and the West is accompanied by the country’s growing maritime 
presence, particularly in its western borderlands, the revitalisation and expansion of 
its ‘strongholds’, and economic diversification. The economic systems of the country’s 
leading coastal region have proven to be highly resistant to geopolitical turbulence; this 
is partly explained by government support.
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Introduction
The sea is a highly significant factor in the socio-economic development 
of today’s Russia. Over the past 20 years, maritime transport has carried over 
60% of the country’s growing imports and exports.1 Forty-two of the RBC top 
100 Russian companies are ‘sea-dependent’ [1]. Maritime economy, including 
the port industry, shipbuilding, marine resource harvesting, and other fields 
account for up to 5.5% of Russia’s GDP [2]. Its main driver is port terminals, 
whose throughput increased 7.8-fold from 1994 to reach 840 million metric 
tons or 3.6% of the world total in 2019.2 National shipbuilding industry is en-
joying a revival [3]. This is especially true of the military side of the industry: 
Russia has been getting 20% of international military contracts.3 Hydrocarbon 
deposits are developed on land and offshore on Sakhalin, Kamchatka, Yamal, 
and in the Caspian Sea. Gas transport infrastructure has been built since 2011. 
The movement of the economy towards the sea affects settlement patterns. 
The country’s 74 coastal cities are home to over 14 m people, which is 12.7% 
of the national urban population. The proportion of ‘coastal residents’ has 
been steadily increasing over the past two decades [4; 5]. The multifaceted 
coastalisation of Russian society and its spatial structure is well in line with 
global trends [6-10]. This process is taking place against the background of 
growing geoeconomic competition and geopolitical confrontation, which have 
increasingly taken place in the World Ocean since the 1970s [11; 12]. The cir-
cumstances and reasons prompting powers to compete for a territory (which 
is the essence of geopolitics according to a leading international specialist in 
the field, the French geographer Yves Lacoste [13]) are becoming an important 
factor and leading motive for maritime activities. The latter acquire a geopolitn-
ical dimension as a result. This article aims to provide a conceptual framework 
for and identify the phenomenon of Russia’s coastal borderlands and their 
strongholds as well as to examine the current geopolitical determinants of the 
economic dynamics with a focus on the land and water structure of Russia’s 
western borderlands.
1 The Transport Strategy of the Russian Federation 2030: approved by regulation No. 1734-
r of the Government of the Russian Federation of November 22, 2008. URL: https://www.
mintrans.ru/documents/3/1009 (accessed 02.02.2020).
2 Review of Maritime Transport. 2018/ United Nations Conference On Trade And Development. 
N. Y. ; Geneva, 2018.




Russia’s coastal borderlands and their strongholds: 
conceptualisation, delimitations, structuring, parametrisation 
In recent years, public consciousness has become pronouncedly geopolitical. 
This placed the notions of border, which is often interpreted as the line between 
‘us’ and ‘them’ [14], and borderlands at the centre of Russian human geograph-
ical discourse [15; 16]. Russian borderlands are ‘amphibious’. The total length 
of the country’s maritime border has been variously estimated at from 35.3 to 46 
thousand km [17—19], which is almost twice the length of its land border. Thus, 
it is possible to identify and conceptualise the phenomenon of Russia’s coastal 
borderlands by bringing elements of a maritime economy, region and border stud-
ies, and geopolitics into this category.
Some key segments of the country’s coastal borderlands either are openly 
claimed by external forces (Crimea, the South Kurils) or experience constant 
pressure (the Kaliningrad exclave in the Baltic). This happens on an even great-
er scale in the Arctic, where Russia’s principal geopolitical opponent is the US 
[21]. In terms of political geography, a specific feature of Russian borderlands is 
that only 3% of the country’s maritime borders are bilateral [18]. In most cases, 
its coastal borderlands are multilateral, i. e. they bring Russia in contact with the 
world community and its global leaders, some of which excel in maritime indus-
tries. A new cold war is expected [10] to recreate the great confrontation between 
the land and the sea redolent of Alfred Mahan’s and Halford Mackinder’s ideol-
ogemes. In this light, keeping coastal borderlands and developing them as centres 
of economy, infrastructure, and community life is an economic necessity as well 
as a factor in and indicator of Russia’s international standing, central to its image 
of a Eurasian and global power. As Vladimir Dergachyov put it, the coast is the 
geopolitical key to Eurasia [22].
Russia’s coastal zone, which skirts its continental mass and accommodates 
most of the geostrategic maritime activities, is vast and multi-layered. It con-
sists of the land and water components. The territorial waters account for 745 
thousand km2 of the country’s coastal borderlands; the continental shelf, for 3.8 
million km2. The area of Russia’s exclusive economic zone is estimated at 7.6 
million km2 [17]. If only a 50 km coastal zone is taken into account, the coastal 
borderlands comprise 10.5% of the country’s territory. There are also basin-re-
lated and regional dimensions to the demarcation of coastal borderlands: Russia 
borders on 12 seas of three oceans and has access to the inland Caspian Sea4; 23 
Russian regions are considered as coastal. Nature, climate, available resource, 
history, and other circumstances account for the gap between the socio-economic 
development of the land and water segments of national borderlands and their 
maritime significance (Tables 1 and 2). Moreover, there are prominent effects of 
specialisation, concentration, and agglomeration at play.




The demographic, economic, and military weight  
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Baltic 0.3 43.2 30.5 7.59 1.2 0.05 18.5
Black and 
Azov 2.9 25.6 30.7 1.97 0.3 2.8 18.8
Caspian 1.5 7.7 0.9 1.31 21.3 4.3 9.4
Pacific 44.1 14.4 25.4 67.73 68.9 49.5 45.5
Arctic 51.2 8.5 12.5 21.40 8.3 43.35 27.8
Source: prepared by the author based on 2019 data from Rosstat, the Russian 
Association of Marine Commercial Ports, and the Ministry of Defence of the Russian 
Federation.
Table 2 
The density of maritime activity localisation  
























per 100 km of Russia’s maritime border 
Baltic 4800.0 268.25 203.17 247.6 27.0
Black-Azov 144.0 3.88 10.32 3.12 66.6
Caspian 237.6 11.21 1.38 954.8 445.5
Pacific 9.38 19.8 1.26 106.0 175.6
Arctic 5.87 5.37 0.53 10.95 133.2
Russian total 36.36 12.86 2.18 67.53 155.84
Source: prepared by the author based on 2019 data from Rosstat and the Russian 
Association of Marine Commercial Ports.
Comment: * LNG is taken into account.
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Spatial concentration is highly characteristic of the port industry. In Russia, 
75% of all cargo is handled by three port clusters. St Petersburg in the Baltic ac-
counts for 29% of cargo handled in the country and 96% in the region; Krasnodar 
in the Black-Azov region, for 26% and 85% respectively; Vladivostok in the Pa-
cific, for 19.4% and 77%. The situation is similar in Russian offshore oil drilling 
(Sakhalin accounts for 67% and the Caspian Sea area, for 21% thereof) and gas 
production including NLG projects (Sakhalin, 49.5%; Yamal, 43.7%). The data 
are as of 2019.
Spatial inequality is observed in the fishing industry as well. It is dominated 
by organisations situated in the Pacific region: fish caught in the Kamchatka area 
comprises 38% of the national total; that caught in the Sakhalin area, for 22%. 
The Murmansk region accounts for two-thirds of the national catch in the Arctic 
basin and the Kaliningrad region, for a similar proportion in the Russian Baltic. 
The Astrakhan region is the leader in the Caspian borderlands with 85%. Local-
isation and concentration apply to the navy too: 27% of the fleet is stationed in 
the Murmansk region; 16%, in the Kaliningrad region, and 15% in the Primorsky 
region.5 Five regions — Murmansk, Kaliningrad, Sevastopol, Kamchatka, and 
Primorsky — account for 85% of the country’s naval force.
Taking into account the specifics of Russia’s borderlands, the national re-
search tradition,6 I deem it appropriate to discuss ‘strongholds’ of the coastal bor-
derlands. This term applies to localities that are foci for the most important and 
propulsive fields of the maritime economy, centres for the land/water system for-
mation, and the key components of the Russian ‘coastalised’ socioeconomic and 
military-strategic space. This interpretation draws on both the Russian methodol-
ogy for spatial analysis of the economy and the international research traditions, 
primarily the maritime cluster concept, which has been actively developing in 
recent decades [24—28].
The strongholds of Russia’s coastal borderlands were identified using a com-
bination of parameters. These parameters are military-strategic (Russian Navy 
bases); geoeconomic (proximity to the main transboundary transport and logis-
tics corridors); innovation and production-related (the localisation and potential 
of shipbuilders, ship design companies, and maritime research centres); mari-
time-economic (contribution to national and regional port throughput, marine 
fish harvest, offshore oil and gas production, coastal and maritime tourism); 
demographic (the concentration of ‘coastal’ population, agglomerations). Four-
teen strongholds, including two emerging ones, were distinguished (Table 3).
5 Warships of the Russian Federation 2020. URL: http://russianships.info/today/ (accessed 
18.03.2020).
6 Veniamin Semyonov-Tyan-Shansky’s idea about the ‘cultural and economic footing for 
colonisation’ as a ‘territorial form of Russia’s mighty dominion’ [23], as well as the concepts 
of ‘hotspots’, ‘nodes’, and other ‘foci’ of spatially organised human activity, developed by 
Nikolay Kolosovsky, Yulian Saushkin, Isaak Maergoiz, Boris Rodoman, Mikhail Sharygin, 




The strongholds of Russia’s coastal borderlands
Cluster Stronghold Maritime specialisations
Baltic
St Petersburg
Port and logistics*, shipbuilding and 
ship repair, maritime production, com-
fortable settlement in coastal zones
Kaliningrad
Navy infrastructure, shipbuilding and 
ship repair, maritime production, mar-
itime recreation and tourism, offshore 
oil and gas production, comfortable 
settlement in coastal zones
Black-Azov
Novorossiysk Port and logistics, comfortable settle-ment in coastal zones
Rostov Port and logistics, comfortable settle-ment in coastal zones
Sevastopol-Crimea
Navy infrastructure, maritime recrea-
tion and tourism, offshore oil and gas 
production, shipbuilding and ship re-
pair, comfortable settlement in coastal 
zones
Sochi-Tuapse
maritime recreation and tourism, com-




Offshore oil and gas production, navy 
infrastructure, shipbuilding and ship 
repair 
Makhachkala-Caspian** Navy infrastructure, port and logistics
Arctic
Murmansk
Navy infrastructure, port and logistics, 
marine resource harvesting, offshore oil 
and gas production
Arkhangelsk Shipbuilding and ship repair, port and logistics
Yamal** Offshore oil and gas production
Pacific
Vladivostok
Port and logistics, navy infrastructure, 
shipbuilding and ship repair, marine 
resource harvesting
Sakhalin
Offshore oil and gas production, marine 
resource harvesting
Kamchatka
Marine resource harvesting, navy 
infrastructure, offshore oil and gas 
production
Comment: * — federal specialisation; ** — emerging strongholds. 
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Incorporated in the land-and-water socioeconomic and geopolitical context 
of coastal borderlands, each stronghold is a complex-forming cluster of mari-
time and, to a varying degree, defence industries. The core elements of a typical 
stronghold (port infrastructure, logistics, and concomitant industries) are locat-
ed within a seaport and its settlement system. The only exception is Yamal. Ten 
out of twelve established strongholds are situated in cities with a population of 
over 250 thousand people; thirteen strongholds are found in coastal agglomer-
ations. These strongholds are important components in the economic and set-
tlement structures of their regions. Home to the key elements of the national 
coastal zone and coastal borderlands, strongholds have a pivotal role in Russia’s 
maritime economy. They account for 92% of national port throughput, 85% of 
marine resource harvesting, 91% of offshore oil and 99% of gas production, 
96% of Russian navy ships. The economic position of these foci of maritime 
power and their dynamics in the light of the geopolitical situation correspond to 
the country’s geostrategic opportunities and prospects.
Current geopolitical turbulence  
as a factor in the economic dynamics of the strongholds  
of Russia’s coastal borderlands
The geoeconomic and geopolitical context is more and more often labelled 
as turbulent [29; 30, etc.]. This is both easy to explain and indicative of undi-
vided attention to constant changes in the global political world order as well as 
to the standings of countries and individual spatial components. Difficult both 
to predict and to control, these changes affect society and its structures that are 
reflected in the public consciousness and research discourse. Turbulence is an 
immediate product and indicator of a multi-polar world, the process in which are 
multidirectional, seemingly chaotic, and hard to predict. It is also a consequence 
of explicit and implicit competition between centres of power. Turbulence man-
ifests itself in the confrontation plaguing many aspects of relations between 
countries and blocs. It spreads to geopolitics, geoeconomics, and various aspects 
of ecopolitics; it affects both material and mental processes, including territorial 
identity, which is central to geopolitics.
Post-Soviet Russia entered the period of intensive geopolitical turbulence 
after the now-apparent bitter strife with the West, which was chronologically 
linked to the Crimea referendum and the beginning of the armed conflict in the 
Donbas region. Both happened in 2014 when Russia was also faced with ad-
verse changes in the global energy market. The situation deteriorated in March 
2020 amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Turbulence brought to the fore the prob-
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lem of borders and border areas [32], highlighting the specifics and significance 
of Russian borderlands, including coastal ones. Analytics shows that it also 
sped up Russia’ maritime activities with resources being redistributed towards 
the Black Sea, Far East, and Arctic [33] as well as accelerated the development 
of the strongholds. Remarkably, during the recession of 2015—2016 and the 
following recovery, the number and maritime potential of the strongholds in-
creased (Table 4).
Table 4
 Dynamics of key maritime activities in Russia in 2017,  
compared to 2013 baseline, %





Baltic 133 64 86 114
Black-Azov 53 - 102 155
Caspian 127 401 215 51
Pacific 113 128 108 132
Arctic 106 100 102 157
National total 115 164 112 134
Source: prepared by the author based on data from Rosstat and the Russian Associa-
tion of Marine Commercial Ports7.
** The Yamal LNG production reached its full capacity in 2019.
New motives, geopolitical and not, to explore the Arctic have expedited 
the rise of the Yamal stronghold, which is expected to grow into a bipolar 
Yamal-Taimyr base. Among other things, there are plans to develop the North-
ern Sea Route, which has been associated with the Greater Eurasia project 
[34]. Today, Yamal is a major growth point for offshore gas production. The 
geostrategic significance of Arkhangelsk, Severodvinsk, and particularly Mur-
mansk and Severmorsk along with other naval bases is increasing. Geostrate-
gic interests account for the creation of the Makhachkala-Caspian stronghold, 
which supplements and duplicates the maritime potential of Astrakhan — an 
emerging centre for gas production. The Sevastopol-Crimea base has been 
7 Russian regions. Socioeconomic performance. 2013. Moscow : Rosstat, 2014; Russian 
regions. Socioeconomic performance. 2019. Moscow : Rosstat, 2020 (https://www.gks.
ru/folder/210/document/13204); Port throughput by basins 2013 and 2018. Russian 
Association of Marine Commercial Ports statistics. URL: https://www.morport.com 
(accessed 18.03.2020).
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actively developing during integration into the Russian political and econom-
ic space. Kamchatka is becoming an ever more important centre for fishery. 
Since 2014, the catch has grown almost 1.5-fold, which comprises 65% of 
the total national increase over the study period. St Petersburg has confirmed 
its standing as a major centre of shipbuilding, maritime technology, human 
resources certification, and innovation. The city is home to 40% of people 
employed in shipbuilding in Russia [3].
The development of strongholds in Russia’s coastal borderlands amid geopo-
litical turbulence is concurrent with the economic standing of the corresponding 
regions (Table 5).
Table 5
Changes in the economic position of Russia’s coastal regions,  
including coastal borderlands strongholds, 2013—2018, -fold
 
Region
GRP per capita to 
the national average
Fixed investment per 
capita to the national 
average
Regional consoli-
date budget revenue 
to the national 
average
2013 2018 2013 2018 2013 2018
St Petersburg 1.30 1.35 1.00 1.31 1.44 1.30
Leningrad region 1.02 1.04 1.54 2.31 0.94 1.09
Kaliningrad region 0.76 0.80 0.76 1.32 0.88 1.50
Krasnodar region 0.82 0.72 1.90 0.76 0.72 0.67
Rostov region 0.57 0.59 0.64 0.52 0.64 0.61
Republic of Crimea* 0.24 0.35 0.33 1.28 0.89 1.09
Sevastopol* 0.30 0.31 0.26 0.80 1.26 1.07
Astrakhan region 0.72 0.94 1.29 0.90 0.69 0.65
Murmansk region 1.05 1.11 0.97 1.71 1.27 1.29
Arkhangelsk region 1.11 1.23 1.40 1.42 1.12 1.00
Primorsky region 0.79 0.76 0.68 0.63 0.87 0.88
Kamchatka region 1.10 1.30 1.09 1.06 3.21 3.30
Sakhalin region 3.62 4.16 3.81 3.87 3.40 3.79
Source: prepared based on data from Rosstat8.
Comment: * data as of 2014.
8 Russian regions. Socioeconomic performance. 2013. Moscow : Rosstat, 2014; Russian 
regions. Socioeconomic performance. 2018. Moscow : Rosstat, 2019 (https://www.gks.ru/
folder/210/document/132040).
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In 2013—2018, eleven out of 13 Russian regions that are home to old 
strongholds dating back to previous centuries witnessed an increase in GRP 
per capita as compared to the national average. The only outsiders were the 
Krasnodar and Primorsky regions. The most impressive growth was observed 
in the Murmansk region, Sakhalin, Kamchatka, and Russian coastal regions in 
the Baltics. A more moderate increase was registered in Crimea, partly because 
of the local geopolitics-related business conditions. The changing economic 
standing of the coastal borderland regions testifies to their high resistance to 
turbulence. This resistance is ensured by Russia’s maritime industry as well as 
national budget and investment priorities. Further development of the strong-
holds, changes in their functions, and their contribution to national maritime 
activities will be determined by the persistent raw materials specialisation of 
the country and centripetal socio-geographical processes focused on Moscow 
and St Petersburg. Equally important factors will be the need for Russia to es-
tablish diversified communications within a Eurasian space [5] and the grow-
ing convergence between geoeconomic and geopolitical processes and inter-
ests. Despite the country’s increasing presence in the Arctic and the impending 
turn to the East, its interests remain Europocentric. This explains the priority 
given to the western borderlands, which are home to eight (!) maritime strong-
holds of the Russian Federation.
The determinants and strategic priorities of maritime stronghold 
development in Russia’s western borderlands
Russia’s western borderlands fringe maritime transnational macroregions 
(Baltic, Black, and Barents) interspersed with ‘intermaria’. The latter are not 
only spaces where integration and confrontation with the West take place but 
also national settlement and economic centres. The most important maritime 
strongholds are concentrated in these areas. Some of them dating back centu-
ries,9 together they account for 70% of the national port throughput and 65% 
of the country’s navy ships. These bases are located near the still significant 
Western target markets10 and the most populated and developed areas of Euro-
pean Russia — 22% of the country’s population live within 500km from the 
eight strongholds of the coastal borderlands. Current geopolitical turbulence 
9 Arkhangelsk was established in the 16th, St Petersburg in the early 18th, and Sevastopol in 
the 18th century.
10 As of January 2020, the EU accounted for 41.2% and other countries of the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean for 15% of Russia’s bilateral trade.
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and its economic dimension as well as the volatility and spatial fragmenta-
tion of global markets create a new reality for Russia’s western borderlands 
and their strongholds. This new reality emerged when the country’s western 
economic centres started to lose their position as exclusive foci for maritime 
activity as the North-East was becoming a national economic priority. Thus, 
western borderlands were increasingly becoming a periphery as compared to 
the major centres and axes of interaction in the maritime economy of Greater 
Eurasia. Note that 11 out of 27 largest Eurasian ports are Chinese. The situ-
ation is aggravated by slowing growth in cargoes handled by Russian ports. 
The throughput was increasing by 15% in 2002—2007 and by 7% in 2014—
2018. Probably, the growth rate will stabilise in the export-import segment, 
which accounts for 80% of the total throughput. This imposes limitations on 
the earlier dominant development model for coastal territories. Extensive and 
multifaceted, it was overly focused on port facilities and investment in them. 
Ensuing instability creates demand for innovations in the functions of the 
strongholds, their economic structure, spatial ties, etc.
Another important feature of maritime activities in the west of Russia is 
the multitude of unique conditions and local determinants. In the Arctic zone, 
where the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk strongholds are located, these are per-
sistent post-Soviet depopulation, high aggregate costs [35], and economic 
risks arising from the precarious global situation. The other segments of Rus-
sia’s western coastal borderlands are attractive to migrants. In 2018, the ratio 
between total net migration to the Russian Baltic and Black Sea areas and that 
to the Moscow agglomeration was 1 to 1.5. Migration translates into both eco-
nomic opportunities and additional socio-political risks. The current dialogue 
between Russia and the West places the Kaliningrad and Sevastopol-Crimea 
strongholds in a difficult situation. Crimea’s level of economic development 
is still half the national median. Turbulence in maritime industries — port 
services, fishery, and recreation — plays an important role as well. The Ka-
liningrad region was adversely affected by the new economic reality brought 
about by the geopolitical changes of 2015, particularly the severance of trans-
boundary ties. Remarkably, in the post-Crimea period, both the Russian Bal-
tic exclave and Crimea11 have been principal recipients of federal subsidies. 
Home to 2.3% of the country’s population, these three regions accounted for 
11.1% of the subsidies in 2015—2017. Half of the federal moneys (565 billion 
roubles) were allocated to the Kaliningrad region.
11 The Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol.
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A new phase of the global economic crisis, which began in March 2020, 
has reduced opportunities for public support for maritime strongholds. The 
geostrategic significance of its western borderlands has increased for Russia. 
It is of critical importance for the economies of the strongholds that the posi-
tive trend observed in transport, logistics [36], and other maritime industries 
continues. It is equally important, however, to restructure and diversify the 
economy. The idea of an industrial port complex, which was produced as ear-
ly as the 1970s, may be of use here [37]. Special attention should be paid to 
the production, service, research and technological segments of the maritime 
economy. Although maritime activities of Russia, its western borderlands, 
and coastal territories within the integration frameworks established over the 
past three years in the Baltic [38] and other areas should be maintained and 
supported, the most urgent problem is integration into trans-Eurasian marine 
communication corridors. This problem is especially acute in Russia’s North-
West. At the same time, quite in line with the strategic goal of promoting the 
economic cohesion of the Russian Federation,12 there is a need to encour-
age interaction between Russian coastal centres and create a flexible, turbu-
lence-resistant network that will serve as a framework for a unified national 
maritime system, which is apparently lacking today. Such a network may ben-
efit from existing corporate links and the resources of the United Shipbuilding 
Corporation, which has production facilities in five maritime strongholds of 
the western borderlands.
Conclusion
The current coastalisation of the Russian Federation is a major, stable, and 
multifarious trend. It is especially pronounced in the country’s coastal border-
lands and its major maritime centres. Global changes and growing turbulence 
necessitate stronger Russian presence in border-area waters and the World 
Ocean. The increasing instability of the present and uncertainty of the future 
point up geopolitical factors and considerations. Since spring 2020, Russian 
centres for maritime activities have been tested again by the intensifying strug-
gle for leadership in the energy market and the contestation of global order. 
Factors in the resistance of Russian strongholds are the market situation, raw 
materials resources, technological innovations, government support, and an 




increase in the efficiency of the national maritime economy. The latter is a 
result of the adaptation of approaches, structures, and strategic decisions to 
coastal conditions.
The study was supported by grants 18-17-00112 Ensuring the Economic Se-
curity of Russia’s Western Borderland Regions During Geopolitical Turbulence 
and 19-18-00005 Russia’s Eurasian Maritime Activities: Regional Economic 
Forecasting from the Russian Science Foundation.
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